Achille Mbembe gives the following definition of Post-Colonial thinking:
In postcolonial thinking, race is the wild region, the beast, of European humanism. To borrow Castoriadis's terms on racism, I'd say that the beast puts it more or less this way: "I alone possess value. But I can only be of value, as myself, if others, as themselves, are without value".
Postcolonial thinking aims to take the beast's skeleton apart, to flush out its favourite places of habitation. More radically, it seeks to know what it is to live under the beast's regime, what kind of life it offers, and what sort of death people die from. It shows that there is, in European colonial humanism, something that has to be called unconscious self-hatred. Racism in general, and colonial racism in particular, represents the transference of this self-hatred to the Other.
There is a second level in the postcolonial critique of European humanism and universalism which, if the term had not given rise to so many misunderstandings, could be called biopolitical. The face of Europe which was experienced by the colony (and before that, under slavery, by the "plantation"), and which gradually became familiar, was far from being that of liberty, equality and fraternity. The totem which colonized peoples discovered behind the mask of humanism and universalism was not only deaf and blind most of the time, it was also, above all, characterized by the desire for its own death, but insofar as this death was necessarily conveyed through that of others, it was a delegated death.
It was also a place where law had nothing to do with justice but, on the contrary, was a way of starting wars, continuing them and perpetuating them; and above all a place where wealth was but a means of exercising over others the right of life and death. As a result it could be said of postcolonial thinking that it is not a critique of power as usually understood, but of force – a force that is incapable of transformation. Once again it is Fanon who has analyzed, better than anyone else, this kind of necropolitical force which, in passing through fiction, becomes sick of life or else, in an act of permanent reversion, takes death for life and life for death. That's why the colonial relationship fluctuates constantly between the desire to exploit the other (seen as racially inferior) and the temptation to eliminate him, to exterminate him.
What – thirdly - characterises postcolonial thinking is entanglement and concatenation, unveiled chiefly through its critique of identity and subjectivity. From this viewpoint it is opposed to a particular Western illusion, that there can be no subject other than in the circular, permanent referral to oneself, to an essential and inexhaustible singularity. In countering this, postcolonial thinking stresses the fact that identity arises from multiplicity and dispersion, that self-referral is only possible in the in-between, in the gap between mark and demark, in co-constitution. In this situation colonisation no longer appears as mechanical and unilateral domination forcing the subjugated into silence and inaction. Quite the reverse – the colonized person is a living, talking, conscious, active individual whose identity arises from a three-pronged movement of violation, erasure and self-rewriting.
I don’t believe in Post-Colonial thinking. No, I shouldn’t say that because it delegitimizes the criticisms that I’m about to make to explain why I feel uncomfortable with not only the expression “Post-Colonial Thinking” but also with its premises and foundations. First, I don’t think that it is too reductive to base a way of thinking on a single negative event and thus arguing that it is the sole formative for millions to people. Colonialism was a traumatic and defining event, but it is part of whole history and cannot be separated from the vast context it belongs to. If Arundhati Roy is right when she asserts vehemently that Colonialism is a form of rape, it cannot, it shouldn’t become the focal point of constructive way of thinking. When it does, the loudest message given becomes that not that existence determines essence, but rather that traumas are essence. In other words, the narrative starts to be that once a rape occurs, it is impossible for the rape victim to be something other than a rape victim; the past is erased; the present and the future are solely conditioned by that atrocious act.
Second, I don’t believe that colonialism was a European phenomenon, that it was a product of “western” culture or philosophy if there is such a thing. I am questioning here the presumption that what Mbembe calls “European Humanism and universalism” led to Colonialism and must therefore be criticized by Post-Colonial thinking. In short, my argument is simply that Post-Colonial Thinking is limited, restrictive, and disempowering because to say things bluntly, it divinizes, willingly or unwillingly, the status of victim and elevates it to the one of omnipotent critique who cannot be wrong and cannot be criticized. Post-Colonial thinking is freedom and judgment without responsibility and because I love Camus and Sartre too much, that bothers me.