Thanks to John Quiggin’s post at Crooked Timber, I was able to read a worth reading article on the American conservative on American wars written by Andrew C. Bacevitch. He makes the point that America is good at starting war because it is a political tool, which influential ideologues love to advocate , and yet it is also at finishing them for precisely the same reasons for with gruesome realities, comes the realization that war cannot be an end and itself and a fix all for everything tough foreign policy question. He isn’t wrong. Sugary excerpt:
An alternative reading of our recent military past might suggest the following: first, that the political utility of force—the range of political problems where force possesses real relevance—is actually quite narrow; second, that definitive victory of the sort that yields a formal surrender ceremony at Appomattox or on the deck of an American warship tends to be a rarity; third, that ambiguous outcomes are much more probable, with those achieved at a cost far greater than even the most conscientious war planner is likely to anticipate; and fourth, that the prudent statesman therefore turns to force only as a last resort and only when the most vital national interests are at stake. Contra Kristol, force is an “instrument” in the same sense that a slot machine or a roulette wheel qualifies as an instrument.
To consider the long bloody chronicle of modern history, big wars and small ones alike, is to affirm the validity of these conclusions. Bellicose ideologues will pretend otherwise. Such are the vagaries of American politics that within the Beltway the views expressed by these ideologues—few of whom have experienced war—will continue to be treated as worthy of consideration. One sees the hand of God at work: the Lord obviously has an acute appreciation for irony. […] The impetus for weaning Americans away from their infatuation with war, if it comes at all, will come from within the officer corps. It certainly won’t come from within the political establishment, the Republican Party gripped by militaristic fantasies and Democrats too fearful of being tagged as weak on national security to exercise independent judgment. Were there any lingering doubt on that score, Barack Obama, the self-described agent of change, removed it once and for all: by upping the ante in Afghanistan he has put his personal imprimatur on the Long War.
The problem comes from the fact that America is a hegemon and that it has had that status for a long time. Few countries (not to say no country) become superpowers, hegemons without believing in the use of force and without using it to protect its interests and enforce its vision of the world. America is in the unique position of being a hegemon with a few ascending powers, but no equals for the most. Too often, because it doesn’t have to compromise or to take into account the sensitivities of an equal, many of its ideologues with clout assume that its incredible military might can quickly and inexpensively resolve every issue. They take the view point that that even if it isn’t successful, the use of force is a way to dispel the notion that America is weak, a power in the decline , or an nation that can messed with. Thus, they always support the notion that war even when it doesn’t solve any issue is almost always a more effective tool than the exercise of any kind of soft power. The problems is that America faces a dilemma every time it finds itself within a war, which might be unwinnable; it has to decide whether surrender is a defeat and within American political culture, it almost always is and costs a president all of his political capital. This fact explains why it is nearly impossible for any president given those facts especially when he is a Democrat easily be tarnished by the cowardice accusation, not to fall within the trap of forgetting that wars almost always have no positive consequences when the objectives are unclear or constantly changing and more importantly when victory is solely defined as avoiding defeat and humiliation.

